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“Why have the Balkan countries responded 
differently to the EU’s pre-accession demands? 
(Noutcheva, 2012: 5)”. In this book Gergana 
Noutcheva aims to explain this puzzle and thereby 
to increase knowledge on the impact of EU pol-
icy in its neighboring countries. The author is an 
associate professor in International Relations 
and European Foreign Policy at the University 
of Maastricht. Her research focuses on the EU 
enlargement and neighborhood policy, in particular 
the impact of the EU on the domestic structures 
of non-EU countries.1 Noutcheva’s most recent 
book on EU influence abroad is based on her 
PhD thesis in 2006, EU Conditionality and Balkan 
Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter?. As I will 
argue below, Noutcheva’s effort stands out thanks 
to an appealing research approach that refines 
previous attempts to explain diverging responses 
to EU demands in receiving countries.
In the first part of her book (Chapters 2 and 
3), Noutcheva takes stock of the literature on 
Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and European Foreign policy to discuss sub-
sequently the theoretical and conceptual under-
pinnings of her research endeavor. As reviewed 
by the author, previous literature on European 
enlargement mainly stressed two mechanisms to 
explain the compliance of CEE countries to the EU’s 
pre-accession demands. According to the rationalist 
“logic of consequences”, compliance is the result of 
domestic political elites’ cost-benefit calculations 
regarding EU conditionality. External incentives, 
such as pre-accession aid and the prospect of EU 
membership, are seen to induce a shift towards 
compliance because domestic actors gradually 
realize that the benefits of accession outweigh 
the costs of adaptation. Alternatively, according to 
the socialization-based “logic of appropriateness”, 
1 http://www.fdcw.unimaas.nl/staff/default.asp?id=294 
 (10 December 2012)
compliance is the product of social learning, where 
domestic actors begin to internalize EU norms 
and values through the regular interaction with 
and persuasion by EU actors. Whereas these 
two explanations have been mostly treated on 
an “either-or” basis of competing hypotheses, 
Noutcheva acknowledges the value of both of 
them to explain the compliance patterns in the 
Balkans. In addition, the author highlights “legal 
coercion” as a further explaining variable, which 
enables the EU to induce compliance beyond 
the conditionality and socialization mechanisms 
in some Western Balkan states. She asserts that 
the EU, as part of the international community 
and via its proper foreign policy instruments, is 
in a position to provoke compliance by exercising 
coercive power on semi-sovereign states such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
While all three above mentioned factors find 
their way into Noutcheva’s model, the author 
gives particular prominence and scrutiny to the 
socialization argument. Departing from dominant 
accounts in the literature, she points out that the 
success or failure of socialization depends on the 
legitimacy of EU conditions. Since actors tend to 
disagree on what is universally legitimate or mutu-
ally beneficial, Noutcheva “proposes to examine 
the reactions of political actors on the receiving 
end of EU policies” as a proxy of legitimacy beliefs 
(Noutcheva, 2012: 37). Hence, instead of assum-
ing the EU’s “normative power”, understood as 
the structuring force of EU norms, Noutcheva 
problematizes these norms by underlining the 
relevance of perceived legitimacy for explaining 
compliance. This may seem obvious for some 
readers, but it represents a pleasing perspective 
change vis-à-vis the Europeanization literature, 
where the appropriateness of EU demands is 
rather taken for granted than questioned.
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA 
European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Balkan Accession: 
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The theoretical framework proposed by Noutcheva 
comprises a three-step model (Noutcheva, 2012: 
32). When EU demands enjoy high legitimacy 
in the would-be member state, one can expect 
substantial compliance to the conditions in ques-
tion, although the costs of compliance perceived 
by domestic elites can have a delaying effect. 
When the legitimacy of EU demands is low, but 
domestic elites consider the benefits of compli-
ance to overturn their costs, the result is partial 
compliance. In case of low legitimacy and prepon-
derance of costs versus benefits, compliance is 
only possible through coercive power. If the EU 
maintains strong pressure in a consistent manner, 
one can observe imposed compliance. When the 
EU is perceived to be weak (or to become weak) 
in maintaining its pressure, imposed compliance 
can turn into fake compliance, which risks to be 
reversed later on (reversed compliance). One 
could surely argue that this step-by-step model 
artificially divides processes that appear simulta-
neously. But from a political science perspective 
the theoretical abstraction of the different variables 
is promising and facilitates a clear analysis of the 
main influencing factors.
Turning in chapter 3 to the legitimization of 
EU pre-accession demands, Noutcheva draws 
the distinction between the “usual” Copenhagen 
criteria and specific additional conditions for the 
Western Balkans countries. The former concern 
the political and economic criteria as well as the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire as agreed 
by the European Council in 1993. As for the for-
mer candidates of CEE, Noutcheva sees these 
conditions to be legitimized by their deep anchor-
age in the values of democracy and economic 
governance that are enshrined in the European 
treaties and secondary law. Regarding the specific 
conditions for the countries of former Yugoslavia, 
the author is particularly concerned with the EU 
demands’ effects on the sovereignty structures 
in several Western Balkan countries, for exam-
ple the country’s international legal status or the 
composition of the state. In these cases of indirect 
sovereignty conditions, Noutcheva considers the 
local response as crucial for evaluating the legiti-
macy of EU demands.
The sovereignty question is also the author’s 
main case selection criteria. Acknowledging the 
complexity of the sovereignty concept, Noutcheva 
focuses on two attributes of authority, i.e. the for-
mal dimension of sovereignty. On the one hand, 
internal sovereignty relates to the presence or 
absence of external actors in the domestic author-
ity structures; on the other, external sovereignty 
refers to the country’s international legal status. 
Along these two dimensions, Noutcheva selects 
four cases out of the “Balkans”2: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (external sovereignty, lack of internal 
sovereignty), Serbia and Montenegro 2002-2006 
(internal sovereignty, lack of external sovereignty), 
Kosovo (lack of internal and external sovereignty) 
and Bulgaria (presence of external and internal 
sovereignty).
The reminder of the book addresses the empiri-
cal examination of these case studies. Part II com-
prises two chapters where the author analyses, 
first, the EU’s demands vis-à-vis each case study 
country (Chapter 4), and second, the EU’s legiti-
mization practices, the coherence between EU 
actors and the compatibility of the EU approach 
with other major actors, e.g. the United States 
(Chapter 5). The third part of the book is devoted 
to the response of the four receiving states. While 
Chapter 6 retraces their compliance record, 
Chapter 7 discusses the “why” of compliance, i.e. 
the reasons for the compliance patterns with refer-
ence to the theoretical framework. Consequently, 
each of the four empirical chapters (4-7) features 
one subchapter for each case study. This section-
ing is comprehensible from an analytical point of 
view but detrimental to the readability. For this 
reason, the mayor results are discussed below 
on a case-by-case basis.
The case of Serbia and Montenegro falls accord-
ing to the author into the category of fake com-
pliance which turned into reversed compliance. 
Whereas the two former Yugoslav republics 
formed a common state after the dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 
the Montenegrin pro-independence movement 
gained weight with the fall of the Milošević regime 
in 2000. The EU, backed by the larger interna-
tional community, championed the re-creation of 
a common state since one feared the destabilizing 
effect of state partition. However, the EU demand 
for a common state was not perceived legitimate 
by the Montenegrin pro-independence actors who 
could invoke the same right for self-determination 
as other former Yugoslav republics. Nor was it 
perceived beneficial from an economic point of 
view because the EU’s insistence on domestic 
economic harmonization went against the diverg-
ing patterns of the economy in the two republics. 
2 The selection of the cases is naturally linked to the study’s 
focus on the “Balkans”. While the author claims that 
“these countries belong to the same historical region 
(Noutcheva, 2012: 10)”, the cultural meaning and con-
notation of the “Balkan” notion is discussed only at the 
margin. Its use in the book seems to arise rather from 
common language than from “implicitly ‘privileging’ some-
thing (Stokes, 1997)”. The same is true for its use in this 
review.
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Due to the pressure of EU actors and the unlike-
lihood of international recognition in case of a 
declaration of independence, the Montenegrin 
government acquiesced to a broad framework 
agreement in 2002 (the “Belgrade agreement”) 
and a Constitutional Charter in 2003. Yet, these 
(fake) compliance moves left many important 
aspects unaddressed and maintained the right 
to call a referendum on independence after a 
period of three years (Noutcheva, 2012: 70f). The 
Montenegrin government’s quest for independence 
was emboldened by the subsequent weakening 
and incoherence of EU pressure in maintaining a 
common state. The lack of legitimacy, perceived 
benefit and EU coercion paved thus the way for 
Montenegrin independence, which followed the 
referendum held in 2006.
The Kosovo case is according to Noutcheva 
an example for imposed compliance. After the 
end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the EU led the 
economic reconstruction of the new UN protector-
ate, but kept a low profile on the sensitive issue 
of the final status (Noutcheva, 2012: 77). From 
a legitimacy perspective, the dilemma regard-
ing Kosovo’s independence is “the legal tension 
between the right to self-determination and the 
principle of territorial integration (Noutcheva, 2012: 
107)”. This dilemma provoked not only diverging 
views between Serbs and Kosovars, but also 
between EU member states. Accordingly, sev-
eral EU members have not recognized Kosovo’s 
independence bid from 2008 due to the fear of 
emboldening own domestic secessionist move-
ments. The EU nevertheless converged in taking 
a pragmatic “approach of diversity in recogni-
tion, but unity in engagement” (Noutcheva, 2012: 
79). In fact, Kosovo’s independence was widely 
seen as a security-enhancing outcome, but the 
EU abstained from legitimizing this step from a 
moral human rights perspective in order to avoid 
a precedent for other secessionist movements. 
International and intra-EU division just enhanced 
the pronounced perception of illegitimacy inside 
Serbia regarding Kosovo’s independence. Faced 
with an ambivalent legitimacy status and the huge 
costs for political parties in Serbia to sell the loss 
of Kosovo to their voters, the EU has heavily pres-
sured Serbia to accept the status quo and pursue 
negotiations with Kosovo’s political leaders. In line 
with the book’s explanatory model, the according 
outcome can be described as imposed compliance.
In the case of Bulgaria, the EU demands were 
the “classic” Copenhagen criteria of democratic 
and economic governance. In contrast to the above 
mentioned cases, the EU could here fully rely on 
the normative appeal of the EU common values 
which were largely welcomed by the Bulgarian 
population. The delayed EU accession of the 
country as compared to the ten accession mem-
bers of 2004 was mainly due to the resistance of 
different domestic actors who tried to shield their 
lucrative positions in the state machinery from EU 
induced reform undertakings. The EU condition-
ality mechanism of incentives and disincentives 
succeeded in the long run to foster substantial 
compliance. As Noutcheva (2012: 186) acknowl-
edges, the politics of compliance in the Bulgarian 
case is somewhat different from the remaining 
selected countries. This is due to the deferred 
time horizon of the Bulgarian accession process 
and, more importantly, to the lack of sovereignty-
related conditions as compared to the other cases. 
It could have been interesting to replace Bulgaria 
with Croatia or to add the latter country to the 
set of cases. Noutcheva (2012: 9) recognizes 
that Bulgaria and Croatia can be categorized in 
the same way regarding the sovereignty status 
(presence of external and internal sovereignty). 
In addition, as Croatia’s accession to the EU is 
imminent, the country would also fit the status of 
substantial compliance as conceptualized by the 
author. At the same time, Croatia shares with the 
remaining country cases the legacy of the war, the 
same starting point of the enlargement process 
and some contested additional EU conditions 
compared to the CEE candidates. For instance, 
the cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), one 
of the “special” conditions inflicted on Croatia dur-
ing the accession negotiations, entailed a certain 
degree of legitimacy-based contestation in Croatia, 
which makes the case interesting vis-à-vis the 
proposed theoretical framework.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author thor-
oughly identifies the underlying state-building 
aspects of the EU’s political and economic reform 
requirements. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 
put in place a highly decentralized state structure 
with a weak central state and two entities with 
state-like competences, i.e. the Serb Republic (RS) 
and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The latter was further divided into ten 
cantons, each with its own legislative and govern-
mental bodies. The main objective of the interna-
tional community throughout the years became to 
enhance the powers of the central state level with 
the justification that the DPA system was inefficient 
and too costly. The High Representative, deployed 
as the guardian of the DPA, was provided in 1997 
with extraordinary powers (the “Bonn powers”), 
which gave him the right to interfere extensively 
in the internal authority structures of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina to foster the implementation of the 
DPA. But as the transfer of competences to the 
state level requires the approval of both entities, 
the High Representative admittedly needed alterna-
tive leverage to his “Bonn powers” for inducing the 
reform steps. The EU filled this gap by requesting 
congenial requirements when the EU perspective 
loomed for Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the year 
2000. Influenced by the High Representative, who 
became double headed as EU special representa-
tive in 2002, the EU asked widely for institutional 
reforms under the normative banner of efficiency 
and accountability. While these norms seemed 
plenty of legitimacy in the eyes of EU actors, the 
demanded reforms touched the core of the con-
tested internal sovereignty structure in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Notably, political leaders in the RS 
were reluctant to cede any competences to the cen-
tral state because they perceived such moves as a 
creeping destruction of the RS. The EU demands 
were thus perceived illegitimate at least in the 
Serbian segment of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
leadership (and society) which could rely on the 
compatibility of its position with the Dayton provi-
sions. Noutcheva argues that the EU succeeded 
nevertheless to induce domestic-driven reform 
projects through intermediary incentives in the EU 
accession process. The author cites the reform 
of the indirect taxation system and the more con-
tested police reform as examples where the par-
ties reached agreement when faced with the pos-
sibility to take an important step on the road to EU 
membership, e.g. the signing of the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA). With a lack 
of perceived legitimacy, but a positive account of 
benefits versus costs thanks to the EU incentives, 
the author classifies Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the category of partial compliance.
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates 
that the book’s compliance typology is not to take 
in a rigid manner. Some authors would probably 
tend to file the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rather in the category of imposed compliance than 
partial compliance. For instance, this view seems 
to be reflected in several works of David Chandler 
who accused external actors (including the EU) of 
“sucking out the life from elected bodies” in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Chandler, 2007: 346; Chandler, 
2011). Furthermore, recent attempts from politi-
cal leaders in RS to roll back previously agreed 
transfers of responsibilities suggest that under 
current circumstances one could tend to reclas-
sify the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as fake 
compliance with first attempts of reversal.
Finally, one could argue that the case of BiH, 
notably the EU’s cutting down of requirements 
related to police reform (Noutcheva, 2012: 167), 
illustrates the context-based volatility of the com-
pliance concept. As Chandler points out, “(…) the 
incremental use of conditionalities is not some 
technical process, it is entirely political. When the 
EU is considering which ‘benchmarks’ are impor-
tant or what level of reforms are necessary for 
the next stage, a large number of factors come 
into play (…) (Chandler, 2010: 78)”. Accordingly, 
compliance benchmarks may change for politi-
cal reasons, and this makes the measurement 
of an “objective” compliance status a cumber-
some venture.
In spite of these points for debate, the reviewed 
book is in summary a highly recommendable con-
tribution and starting point for further research. The 
theoretical framework enables to combine different 
explanatory perspectives (logic of consequences/
logic of appropriateness) that were often artifi-
cially separated in the previous literature for the 
sake of “scientific” hypotheses competition. While 
the author’s inclusive theoretical approach is cer-
tainly detrimental to the parsimony of explanation, 
it carries the great advantage of drawing theory 
closer to reality. Furthermore, the study advocates a 
much needed perspective change for the research 
on EU norm diffusion. Previous literature consid-
ered EU demands mostly as given (exogenous) 
or embedded in near to undisputable norms. By 
contrast, Noutcheva’s work suggests that norms 
are exposed to contestation and that we need to 
look at their legitimacy in the eyes of receiving 
actors (see also Wiener, 2007). Recent resistance 
to austerity measures (or norms) in several EU 
countries and growing Euroscepticism suggest 
that this insight is not limited to EU enlargement 
or cases of contested sovereignty. More gener-
ally, international norms, rules and standards 
coined by Western civilization are not automati-
cally perceived as legitimate in other parts of the 
world. The challenge is to thoroughly analyze the 
politics of norms and the legitimacy perceptions 
of affected actors (e.g. emerging and developing 
countries) without falling into pure relativism or 
polemic debates on Western imperialism.
Ivo Križić
University of Lucerne
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